INTRODUCTION
Precedent seems to exercise an influence that greatly exceeds its logical importance or legal force .... Sometimes, to be sure, there is a reason for a measure of uniformity, and sometimes there is enough similarity in the circumstances to explain similar outcomes; but more often it seems that there is simply no heart left in the bargaining when it takes place under the shadow of soine dramatic and conspicuous precedent.
' [V ol. 104: 1033 That boilerplate is pervasive is hardly surprising. In a variety of ways, standardized terms in day-to-day contracts serve an essential cost-saving fu nction. By this measure, one might expect less frequent reliance on boi lerplate in high-value contracts among sophisticated parties. Ye t standard terms would appear to be no less widespread in contracts among the sophis ticated. Notwithstanding their representation by able counsel, charged to craft comprehensive and detailed, but also particularized, contracts, such parties will commonly conclude agreements comprised heavily of tradi tional terms--contracting norms of a sort-rather than terms tailored to the distinct features of their particular bargain. fu rther attention to this pattern is in order. 11 Boilerplate may serve additional fu nctions in bargaining among sophisticated parties-and perhaps even in contracting generally-than the above models suggest. 12 Specifically, I
would supplement existing transaction-cost and network-effect theories with what I will term a "strategic" theory of boilerplate. A strategic conception of boilerplate begins with a sense of bargaining as characterized by both coordination and conflict. Thinking about bargain ing-whether in contracts or elsewhere-is often oriented to the dimensions of conflict between the parties. This is hardly surprising, given how much of what is interesting about the interaction of bargaining parties hinges on the divergences in their preferences, payoffs, and resulting strategies. In point of fact, however, the essential dynamic in bargaining is one of coordination.
Contrary to the rhetoric sometimes used to describe bargaining, the ultimate goal is not to win but to agree. Agree on one's preferred terms, no doubt, but 1 3 agree nonetheless. 
13.
See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. I do not mean to suggest that bargaining parties would prefer any agreement over a failure to agree. Naturally, agreement must fall within the contracting universe acceptable to both parties. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. The ultimate goal within any given negotiation, however, is to agree.
14. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text; see also Robert 
15.
It is not boilerplate in the sense of some particularly fixed language that is at issue
herein, but rather the consistent inclusion of certain conventional contract provisions-contracting norms or standards of a sort. In slightly different terms, the present analysis might be seen as di rected to terms that are not negotiated by the parties but fixed for inclusion in advance of any functions that boilerplate may serve in contract bargaining, particularly among sophisticated parties but perhaps more generally as well. The first is a signaling function. In the case of boilerplate, however, the signal of inter est derives not from the substance of the relevant term but from its character as a standard rather than tailored term. Additionally, I consider potential coordination functions of boilerplate that rest on the nature of boilerplate as a focal point in bargaining. 16 In this pair of signaling and coordination func tions, one might find the foundations of a strategic theory of boilerplate. What do I mean to capture with a strategic approach to boilerplate? In broad terms, the language of strategy calls attention to the potential use of boilerplate as a mechanism for parties to seek affirmative advantage in bar gaining.
17 In emphasizing a sharply instrumental intent behind the use of boiler plate, I highlight strategy in a further sense. When boilerplate is used for strategic reasons, it concerns ends beyond the particular choice of terms. The intent of the party pressing boilerplate terms is divorced, at least in a direct sense, from the content of those terms. The strategic use of boilerplate is about something more than the content of the relevant term.
Finally, the strategic analysis of boilerplate herein serves to call attention to an affirmative role for focal points in law. Focal points have been widely referenced in the legal literature but predominantly in what might be characterized as a passive form. In Schelling's terms, legal scholars have focused on the role of focal points in "tacit coordination"-situations in which conflict (as well as communication) is lacking.
19 But the most significant role of focal points-including boilerplate terms-is strategic. Focal points do not simply exist; they can be created to help parties secure advantage in conflict and bargaining. In its attention to focal points, then, a
16. Other strategic functions of boilerplate might be identified as well, although they are not emphasized herein. At least three potential "control" functions of boilerplate usage are noted infra, at notes 30, 142 & 144.
17.
Cf Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive Bargaining, 1996 J. D1sr. REsoL. 325, 326 (defining "competitive bargaining"). It bears noting, however, that just as simple contracts may not evidence an absence of "venality" or "self-interest" in contract negotiation, see Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 91, 118-19 (2000) , neither may the proposed use of standard terms.
[Vol. 104:1033 strategic analysis of boilerplate may have implications for legal analysis more generally.
My analysis begins with an acknowledgement of the mixed-motive char acter of bargaining and suggestion of the resulting distortion of direct communication in contract negotiation. Parts II and III explore the pair of strategic functions noted above. The former considers the potential signaling functions of boilerplate in bargaining, exploring both more conventional signals of character and potential signals of group identity. The latter turns to the coordination functions of boilerplate. After further describing the na ture of bargaining as a coordination game and suggesting the resulting applicability of Schelling's focal point paradigm, I successively consider the potential role of boilerplate in both the presence and the absence of commu nication--cases of "explicit" and "tacit" bargaining.
Part IV concludes by considering various implications of a strategic the ory of boilerplate. Among other implications, I posit that notions of bargaining power are necessarily altered within such a theory. Additionally, the approach I propose offers both descriptive and prescriptive lessons for the evolution of boilerplate and for expected bargaining patterns around boi lerplate. Finally, if boilerplate has the focal effects I describe, I suggest that the concerns associated with adhesion contracts may arise even in the pres ence of bargaining parity.
Collectively, these implications offer important lessons for our under standing of contract barg3.ining. As a descriptive matter, the use of boilerplate by sophisticated pa,rt:ies may owe much to its strategic functions. Even where strategy has historically played little role in the use of boiler plate, however, the analysis and implications offered below suggest the value of greater strategic thinking among sophisticated parties in their use of boilerplate.
I. CONFLICT, COORDINATION, AND COMMUNICATION IN BARGAINING
In thinking about the dynamics of bargaining-whether contractual or otherwise-we commonly focus on the dimension of conflict in the relevant interaction. In this perspective, parties have divergent interests that drive their bargain with one another. Each hopes to bargain its way to a greater potential share of the contractual (or similar) surplus. To this end, the parties push, cajole, and otherwise negotiate with each other.
In reality, however, the heart of bargaining is not conflict but coordina tion.
20 Bargaining parties' operative goal is to reach agreement. This requires terms to which both parties can agree-in essence, terms around which they can coordinate. 21 This primacy of coordination is evident when we think 20. I do not mean to suggest that conflict is Jacking in bargaining. Divergent preferences are no less essential to a dynamic of bargaining than the common goal of coordination. Without some such conflict, "bargaining" ceases to be worthy of the name. My point is merely to emphasize the more commonly overlooked dimension of coordination that is also at work.
21.
The subject of coordination, as I will elaborate infra, is the parties' expectations of one another. See Thomas C. Schelling, Bargaining, Co mmunication, and Limited Wa r, I CONFLICT about the desired ends of contract negotiations as opposed to litigation. In bargaining, neither party seeks to crush its opponent. Notwithstanding sometimes loosely used rhetoric, neither aspires to a contract that is truly one-sided. Such a contract would, predictably, be rejected. Instead, each party wants the best deal that it can actually get. Trades would not take place unless it were advantageous to the parties concerned. Of course, it is better to strike as good a bargain as one's bargaining position permits. The worst outcome is when, by overreaching greed, no bargain is struck, and a trade that could have been advanta geous to both parties does not come off at all.
HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 33 (1982) (quoting Franklin).
23. Some concession to each side may be valued even in litigation, given its potential to diminish the prospect of appeal, to enhance the likelihood of voluntary compliance, and the like.
"[T]
he process of agreeing to a set of contractual terms is a coordination game." Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 112; cf Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1222 (suggesting role of forrn contracts in facilitating coordination).
25. See Utset, supra note 21, at 71-72 (describing coordination game dynamic in negotia tion, and potential for coordination failure: parties "may literally talk past each other and fa il to reach a bargain"); see also 28. See Ahdieh, supra note 14, at 239-41.
29. See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 112. On the difficulties of relying on communication, see Goodpaster, supra note I 7, at 342-43 (''The information the competitive negotiator seeks is the other party's bottom line. How much he will maximally give or minimally accept to make a deal. On the other hand, the competitive negotiator wants to persuade the other side about the firmness of the negotiator's own asserted bottom line. The competitive negotiator works to convince the other party that it will settle only at some point that is higher (or lower, as the case may be) than its actual and unrevealed bottom line."). The present argument is distinct from ordinary treatments of signaling, as the signal of interest herein arises not from the substance of the term of fered 36 but from the proposed term's consistency with or deviation from the preexisting contracting norm. 37 When a warranty is conceived as a signal of product quality, the notion is that the manufacturer's willingness to stand behind the product communicates private information regarding the prod uct's reliability. Likewise, a signaling conception of unanimous action clauses in sovereign debt instruments posits that they communicate a debtor's commitment to avoid default. 38 Here, by contrast, the notion is that the adoption of or the failure to adopt a standard term-whether it be a war ranty or warranty disclaimer, or a unanimous action clause or collective action clause--communicates certain information, independent of the subf h . . 39 stance o t e prov1s10n. here is a signaling component to one's behavior, independent of whether one has or has not internalized the relevant norm. ").
30.

35.
See supra Part I.
36.
Omri Ben-Shahar and John Pottow characterize this as the "direct value " of the relevant term. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15, at 3.
37.
With an eye to default rules, Ben-Shahar and Pottow have made analogous observations regarding the signaling effects of standard terms and offered potential examples of this pattern. See id. 
39.
The notion of boilerplate signaling I suggest is directly in line with Ayres and Gertner's suggestion that a party may adhere to a suboptimal default rule in order to conceal private informa tion regarding the subject matter of the relevant term. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 32; see also Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 109-10. As Korobkin suggests, however, adherence may also be motivated by a desire to conceal information independent of the relevant term. See Russell Korob kin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 620 (1998).
As explored in the legal literature, signals might generally be grouped into affirmative words or deeds designed to signal information regarding the speaker or actor, and statements or moves by a party designed to elicit re sponsive signals from another party. By dint of certain standard or conventional commitments, a party can effectively signal that it will be a suitable contracting partner. 4 0 Conversely, but still strategically, a party may also rely on the proposed use of boilerplate to elicit signals from its negoti ating counterpart about the latter's character. In these successive cases, the proposed use of boilerplate might respectively be said to produce pooling and separating equilibria.
Affirmative Signals
The proposed use of boilerplate may produce a pooling effect of sorts in speaking to the character of the proposing party or the transaction it pro Additionally, however, early shifts to the newer standard may have offered a signal of private information regarding greater prospects of hostile takeover activity, given a correlation between use of dual trigger covenants and such activity. 48 In the design of the particular event risk covenant used, moreover, further signals might be found, as with the inclusion of a more limited col lection of triggering events than was conventional-for example, the exclusion of a change in board composition--or the offering of a less-thanstandard remedy. 49
As suggested by the foregoing examples, the bargaining opportunity sets most suited to boilerplate's signaling effects are binary in nature. The starker a choice-as in the choice between hostile control change and dual trigger event risk covenants-the clearer the relevant signal.
50 By contrast, the coor dination functions of boilerplate are at their acme when bargaining parties face an array of contracting altematives. 51
As the examples offered also suggest, the relevant boilerplate signal may often have some significant temporal feature. The choice between hostile control change and dual trigger event risk covenants involved a shift in the contractual norm over time.
52 49. In the case of anti-dilution provisions, similarly, some broad signal might be offered by a debtor's election to use the older conversion price standard versus a newer market price term. Such a choice might be expected to signal a relatively narrower conception of the anti-dilution function. See Bratton, supra note 2, at 687 n.76; Stanley A. Kaplan 52. See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2. Another exam ple of a shift in boilerplate over time, giving rise to similar signaling patterns, was the disappearance of debt covenants and restrictions on subsequent liens and dividends from the debt instruments of large corporations between the 1970s and the mid-I 980s, and their replacement by negative pledge covenants against added secured debt and by prohibitions on the sale and leaseback of assets.
shifts in boilerplate usages would offer its own, distinct signal. While not all boilerplate signals will have this character, one might expect some temporal element to often be present in complex contracting, with its gradual shifts in boilerplate over time. 53
Most importantly, however, as to each of the above examples, it is essen tial to appreciate a signal of interest that is entirely independent of the substance of the relevant provision. 5 4 While the substantive choice of term offers some signal on its merits, it also offers a distinct signal as boilerplate or deviation from boilerplate. This becomes clearer when we consider the range of potential proposals to deviate from boilerplate, with changes ad verse to the non-drafting party at one end of the spectrum (and suggested by the examples above), and changes of seeming benefit to the non-drafting party at the other. In the case of adverse deviations from boilerplate, both the abandonment of a norm and the substantive shift to a less favorable term communicate a negative signal to the other party. Minimally, the deviation from boilerplate to offer less favorable terms enhances the strength of the substantive adverse signal.
When one considers proposed deviations that are seemingly beneficial to the non-drafting party, however, this correlation disappears. In the choice between a hostile control change or a dual trigger form of event risk cove nant, for example, it bears noting that a relatively uncommon third form highly favorable to creditors-was also available. Pure rating decline cove nants-triggered by any rating decline, regardless of cause--deviated from boilerplate, yet offered much more favorable terms to the non-drafting party. 55
In such circumstances, the distinction between the signal arising from boilerplate deviation and that arising from the substantive choice of term emerges more starkly. Given such divergence, however, there is at least the prospect that even a favorable deviation from boilerplate could constitute an adverse signal. 5 6 This may simply be an issue of raising suspicions regarding the reason for the deviation-suspicions not susceptible to alleviation
53.
Cf Korobkin, supra note 10.
54. 56. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15, at 2-3; Gilo & Porat, supra note 12; Hill, supra note 2, at 69 (noting that even improvements in "The Form" may constitute negative signal); cf Korobkin, supra note 39. Eggleston, Posner, and Zeckhauser suggest that even the addition of language "to protect the other against one's own opportunism" may constitute an adverse signal. See Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 118-19. At the extreme, one might conceive of below-market offers to sell or offers to buy at a premium in this light. Attractive as they may be, such offers may also raise questions. See, e.g., id. at 109-10.
[Vol. 104:1033 through communication, given the mixed motives in play. Among the so phisticated parties of interest in the present analysis, this possibility may be especially significant. Proposed deviations from boilerplate by unsophisti cated or unrepresented parties might be written off as devoid of any meaningful signal. By contrast, a sophisticated party and its even more so phisticated counsel are more likely to intend something when they deviate from standard terms.
57 When made by counsel, seemingly favorable devia tions from the norm may be more likely to be interpreted as craftiness than as simple concession. Notably, such adverse signaling may arise even from the most minimal of deviations.
58 Even small changes raise the question, "Why?" Perhaps more importantly, small changes may raise questions as to what further changes are hidden within ''The Form." 59 The selection of particular terms from the less borrower-friendly 1983 Model Simplified Indenture ("MSI"), for example, rather than the revised 1999 MSI, might trigger concerns about the entire range of choices made in the relevant indenture. 6() One might also appreciate the adverse signals attending even favorable deviations from boilerplate within a private information framework. As sug gested above, the proposed use of boilerplate might be seen to signal a lack of private information. Deviations toward terms less favorable to the non drafting party, by contrast, might suggest the presence of such information.
The proposal of non-boilerplate terms favorable to the other party, however, is no different. It still signals private information; it is simply favorable in formation. Ye t such indication of private information may raise concern about the presence of other private information. 61 Stating it differently, it may raise questions about why the party offering the favorable term cannot compete effectively with standard market terms. Why might the party need to offer a premium? Going a step further, the deviation from boilerplate to offer preferred terms might be seen to indicate an unwillingness or perhaps inability to be subject to the market. Such an offer might signal a party too anxious to make a deal. Use of a rare, pure rating decline event risk cove nant might be expected to trigger such an adverse response, alongside its substantive signal of creditworthiness. 62
57. See Hill & King, supra note 43, at 899 (describing negotiations among sophisticated parties of verbiage to be used in contract as searches for "strategic handles or ambiguities that the other party might exploit").
58.
Cf Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 109-10 (noting employer's potential offer of higher sales commission as signal of private information of low sales).
59. See Hill, supra note 2, at 72, 79 (suggesting worries about adverse signaling may deter even obvious improvements in the forms utilized within large law firms, let alone innovations). Aside from its adverse or positive effect, favorable deviations from boi lerplate might also signal particular understandings or conceptions of the drafting party. Anti-dilution provisions in corporate debt, for example, have been conceptualized in a variety of ways.
63 By offering anti-dilution terms more favorable than the norm, a party might signal its particular understand ing of the nature of anti-dilution protections.
In the broadest terms, even favorable deviations from boilerplate may simply call attention to the relevant drafting party or the deal it proposes. Such heightened attention may sometimes be favorable, but may also be unwelcome. This does not mean, of course, that any deviation from boiler plate, no matter how favorable, will constitute an adverse signal in toto. Rather, when the substantive change in term is sufficiently favorable, the attendant benefits are likely to drown out any negative signal that the devia tion from boilerplate sends. Deviations from the contracting norm may be problematic, by contrast, where they offer only limited substantive benefit to a counterparty.
Finally, the foregoing may suggest the possibility of thinking about the role of boilerplate in bargaining in somewhat distinct terms from those de scribed above. As already pointed out with reference to disadvantageous deviations from boilerplate, the abandonment of a standard term may mini mally strengthen the force of the substantive adverse signal. Similarly, when a party proposes favorable deviations from boilerplate, the boilerplate's function might be to establish a negotiating benchmark against which the deviations will more strongly communicate a positive signal. In this conception, the af firmative functions of boilerplate in bargaining can arise from adherence or from deviation. Once boilerplate sets a baseline, in essence, favorable devia tions from it-for example, a debtor 's election of a pure rating decline covenant or use of the original MSI-may offer an even clearer positive sig nal. As I will suggest below, then, a repeat player might be seen to benefit from defining a relevant contracting norm distant from its reservation point not only for substantive reasons, but also to ensure its consistent ability to offer favorable deviations from the norm and a resulting positive signal. 64
Responsive Signals
Each of the foregoing aspects of boilerplate's signaling functions arises similarly in the use of boilerplate not to disseminate information but to elicit it. Just as the proposed use of boilerplate may trigger a pooling equilibrium of sorts by suggesting a median level of risk and lack of pri vate information in the hands of the drafting party, it may also produce a 63. See supra note 49.
64. See infra Section IV.B. Again, it bears recalling that the utility of-and perhaps the need fo r-such signals derives from the limits on direct communication in bargaining, given the presence of some dimension of conflict alongside an operative dynamic of coordination. See supra Part I.
[Vol. 104:1033 separating equilibrium of sorts. In essence, it may permit the identification of more risky counterparties or transactions. 65
A party may be a less attractive contracting partner for a variety of rea sons, including a relatively greater propensity for default or tendency to litigate upon default.
66 When a party resists proposed boilerplate, the draft ing party may be signaled of some such greater risk. The median contracting party might be expected to be amenable to standardized terms. By contrast, a party more at risk of default or more prone to litigation is more likely to seek particularized terms pertaining to such contingencies. 67 Others have discussed this possibility, though primarily with reference to the use of standard-form contracts of adhesion.
68 In this line of analysis, the use of adhesion contracts can be understood as a means to discoura�e higher-risk counterparties from contracting or to force such parties to reveal their risk profiles. 69 Ye t the same principle may operate more broadly ; it may play out with form contracts generally. Under the present analysis, it may arise from any proposed use of the contracting norm, even within generally non-standardized contracts. As to such terms, some signaling of adverse information regarding a potential contracting partner may obtain from that partner 's desire to deviate from proposed boilerplate. 70
Here, a binary dimension to the choice between the standard term and the alternative is likely to be even more relevant than with the affirmative signals discussed previously. 67. See Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 110 (A party "will be less suspicious if the pro posed contract is a standard contract, rather than one ostensibly tailored to today's individual circumstances, because a simple standard contract, which applies to heterogeneous circumstances, is less likely to exploit individualized asymmetric information .... Therefore, asymmetry of informa tion may lead parties to use equivalent contracts over a broad range of circumstances, even though optimality would require heterogeneous and context-specific contracts."). In the-perhaps unlikely-alternative, a willingness to accept boilerplate without revision might also be seen to signal a prospect of gross default, and consequent disinterest in dickering over contract terms. The responsive signal elicited by the proposed use of boilerplate may consequently be inflected with some degree of noise. 70. This pattern might be readily captured by boilerplate provisions for the non-assumption of debts and liabilities in the case of an asset sale. A counterparty's resistance to such a provision may signal the presence of hidden debts or liabilities. Standard provisions providing for the arbitra tion of disputes might also be a relevant example. In this case, demand for authority to pursue other means of legal recourse might signal a greater likelihood of, or at least a greater willingness to en gage in, dispute. See Korobkin, supra note 62, at 1270 & n.205.
71. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. the signal attaches even less to the substance of the deviation demanded by the non-drafting party than to the very demand for deviation. This is evident with respect to favorable deviations sought by non-drafting parties. In the latter case, the non-drafting party is not writing on a clean slate. Rather, it has before it a boilerplate provision drafted by its counterparty. To affirma tively rej ect the boilerplate term and demand a deviation harmful to one's substantive interests would be expected to raise all the suspicions outlined above, yet even more forcefully. 72
B. Signaling Group Identity 78 The use of one boilerplate term or the other thus helped signal that the contract was an English-law or New York-law bond. More significantly, it was seen as some signal of the grouping of the borrower within the category of either
72.
One might reasonably predict that the strategic payoff from the invocation of boilerplate as a signaling device would be characterized by diminishing returns. Over time, the information to be offered or elicited through boilerplate usage is likely to be discounted through some internaliza tion of the potential returns from any such strategic use of boilerplate. In the presence of significant information asymmetries, however, some significant-even if diminished-signaling effect might nonetheless persist. The noise in the information signaled would necessarily increase as negotiators absorb the utility of strategic behavior. Even then, however, it may constitute the best information available.
73.
See Although a less familiar signaling paradigm, such signaling of group identity may offer an even clearer case of the signaling effects of boilerplate. When some sufficient consistency can be observed between particular pro visions and the users of those provisions, boilerplate may serve an important classification function.
In sum, some signaling function may be an important element in the strategic use of boilerplate. In essence, by proposing the use of boilerplate, a bargaining party may convey certain information regarding the character and relative risks of the party itself and the proposed transaction. A party may also be able to extract valuable information regarding its counterparty. Finally, in appropriate circumstances, boilerplate may help to communicate identity. In each of these ways, the use of boilerplate may serve important . f
. 82 expressive unctions.
Ill. THE COORDINATION FUNCTIONS OF BOILERPLATE
The use of boilerplate in bargaining may play an important role in facili tating agreement at an equilibrium favorable to a particular party. Because of the multiple equilibrium dynamic of bargaining, some extrinsic mecha nism will often be needed to define the parties' ultimate point of agreement.
79. Cf Ahdieh, supra note 3, at 707 (discussing concern among debtor states that changes to standard bond terms to make restructuring easier might increase borrowing costs or exclude debtor nations from international debt markets).
80. See id. at 698-700.
81. Other examples of boilerplate terms indicative of group identity might also be offered. A simple case might be the inclusion of a certain type of certified warranty, distinct to a particular group of assertedly "high-quality " producers. In the case of debt instruments, the consistent inclu sion of business covenants in junk bonds and their consistent exclusion from investment-grade bonds in the 1980s, see In this exercise in coordination, boilerplate may offer a "focal point" of sorts, facilitating resolution of the game.
A. Conflict and Coordination in Bargaining
As described at the outset, contract bargaining is fairly understood as a type of coordination game.
83 Characteristic of such games is the presence of multiple equilibria. Rather than a single stable solution, an array of potential outcomes, once reached, exhibit significant stability. 84 Bargaining parties might thus reach myriad potential deals over any individual term of their agreement or the agreement as a whole. 85
How, then, do parties solve the coordination game of contract bargain ing? Three scenarios present themselves, assuming each party has some range of acceptable outcomes, from its ideal outcome (that is, near-complete capitulation by the counterparty) to its "reservation point"-the least favor able outcome the party would be willing to accept.
86 Given the existence of such a range for each bargaining party, the first possibility is no overlap. In this case, there is no game at all, as the parties simply cannot agree. 87 Next, there is the possibility that the parties' bargaining ranges abut one another.
In this scenario, of course, only one equilibrium is common to both parties. If that point can be identified in bargaining, contracting will occur; other wise, it will not. Again, however, there is no game. 88
It is only when the parties' bargaining ranges overlap that multiple equi libria and a resulting game of coordination emerges.
89 In numerical terms, one can imagine a party on one side who is willing to sell for any price greater than $4.00. The buyer, meanwhile, is willing to take the item for free or to pay anything up to $6.00. In this dynamic, any price between $4.00
83. See supra Part I.
84. This multiple equilibrium dynamic in coordination games is often contrasted with the more familiar pattern of the Prisoner's Dilemma. While players' incentives favor defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma, no player can be expected to deviate from the equilibrium achieved in a coor dination game. See Ahdieh, supra note 14, at 230.
85.
If all contract terms are efficiently priced, see Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Cm. L. REV. 1203, 1209-10 (2003), it bears noting that the implications of non-price negotiations are necessarily limited. Yet any number of constraints, including bounded rationality, see id. at 1222-25, and asymmetric information, may limit such contracting efficiency. Further, asymmetric valuations-including asymmetric risk pref erences-may also create some enhanced utility from the negotiation of particular contract terms. See Korobk:in, supra note 61, at 1813-14.
86. I borrow the terms of the negotiating process-"reservation point," "bargaining zone," "commitment point," and "deal point" -from Russell Ko robkin. See Korobkin But on what price-at what "deal point"-will the parties actually agree? Along the undifferentiated scale from $4.00 to $6.00, any thing is possible, including a failure to contract.
91 If some point of agreement is to be reached, however, bargaining power is generally expected to define it. In essence, one would predict a solution at, or at least relatively closer to, the preferred outcome of the party most capable of resisting concessions. 92 In the terms of the Rubenstein bargaining solution, for example, the party with greater capacity for patience-the party facing lower costs of delay-will likely secure a price closest to its preferred result. 93
Yet why is $6.00 the deal point dictated by a dominant seller's bargain ing power rather than $5.00? In essence, this price would appear to leave too much of the surplus with the relatively "powerless" buyer. Yet even if the seller's bargaining power drives the result to the outcome most favorable to the seller yet still within the contracting range of the buyer, the seller does not know whether the buyer's reservation point is $5.00 or $6.00. Recall the dynamic in bargaining, in which players actively compete to secure favor able terms while maintaining an orientation to the ultimate goal of coordination--of agreement.
94 Within this dynamic, each party will ration ally seek to define a "commitment point"-a point beyond which it claims it will not concede further-at some remove from its reservation point. The greater the distance that its asserted commitment point stands from its true reservation point, the better. 95
Each party thus seeks to define a commitment point as close to its pre ferred end of the contracting spectrum as possible. But how do they do so? If the buyer's real reservation point is $6.00, how might she credibly draw a line at $5.00, or lower? Given a coordination dynamic, the seller is fully aware of the buyer's shared preference to reach agreement. As a result, the seller can be expected to push against the buyer's asserted unwillingness to pay more than $5.00, and to demand $6.00, then $7.00, and so on. When does this pattern come to an end? Naturally, one bound is the buyer's reser vation point-$6.00 in our example. But the buyer prefers to pay less.
How-if at all--can she define a lower price from which she will not con cede further? Each party's strategy is guided mainly by what he expects the other to accept or insist on; yet each knows that the other is guided by reciprocal thoughts. The final outcome must be a point from which neither expects the other to retreat; yet the main ingredient of this expectation is what one thinks the other expects the first to expect, and so on. Somehow, out of this fluid and indeterminate situation that seemingly provides no logical reason for anybody to expect anything except what he expects to be expected to expect, a decision is reached. These infinitely reflexive expectations must somehow converge on a single point, at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat. (2004) . The attempt to select a point of agreement among multiple equilibria, Schelling posited, is less "rational" than intuitive-even artistic. See Schelling, supra note 21, at 21, 22 ("Poets may do better than logicians at this game."); see also RAIFFA, supra note 22. It requires what might today be termed "fuzzy logic." Party A needs to determine what Party B will expect Party A to expect Party B to be willing to accept, and so on, for agreement at that point will offer Party A the greatest share of the contractual surplus.
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wi Wi thin this paradigm, if a particular point stands out, it will predictably emerge as the equilibrium solution absent communication. Each party will expect the other to select the prominent point as the likely solution and will therefore choose that point itself. The ultimate coordination point, thus, is simply the one that commands attention as the obvious place for agreement; the winner of the bargain, in turn, is the party whose preferred bargaining outcome sits closest to that point.
wz Assuming a commitment to coordina tion, the other party cannot withhold its acquiescence and demand greater compromise, for the proposed solution offered by the focal point is the only solution that can effectively align the parties ' expectations. to) Focal points thus determine the outcome of a coordination game by shaping individual expectations of the likely behavior of other individuals. 104
Describing the role of focal points in facilitating coordination, Schelling began with cases of "tacit coordination"-interactions characterized by both an absence of communication ("tacit") and an alignment of player incentives ("coordination"). When player interests are aligned, lack of communication is the sole obstacle to efficient resolution of the game. ws In such a dy namic, the role of focal points is readily apparent. For the husband and wife sepa rated in the department store, the focal point of the "lost and found" desk however irrational it might be-emerges as the appropriate meeting place.
106
By contrast with any other equally good or even preferable meeting place, it stands out and is consequently the best place for each spouse to go and therefore to meet. While the legal literature has looked to focal points primarily in such cases of tacit coordination, Schelling's most significant insights come as he turns from pure coordination to a bargaining dy namic more apposite to the present analysis. In "tacit bargaining," communication is still lacking, but I 0 I. Schelling drew evidence of this pattern from a series of ad hoc empirical studies demon strating that two parties attempting to coordinate without communication could typically intuit a focal point based on common understandings and norms. See McAdams, supra note 99, at 1660-61; see also Smith, supra note 42, at 1129 ("Salience is psychological prominence, and experimental studies show that people are good at coordinating by converging on prominent solutions.").
102. See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 58-59.
See id.
104. See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 100, at 1265 ("An equilibrium is focal if it has some fe ature that draws unique attention to itself, making it stand out among all equilibria .... If for some psychological, historical, or cultural reason, the players are aware that one equilibrium draws special mental attention from all the players .... [t]he resulting expectations are self-fulfilling: Once a player believes the other players are headed for a particular equilibrium, the player's best response is to engage in the strategy associated with that equilibrium."). player interests diverge. w7 Because coordination remains the goal, however, focal points can continue to play a role. Schelling captures as much with his tale of separated parachutists who must find each other, who have identical maps of the terrain on which they have landed, but who cannot communi cate.
108 In this dynamic, Schelling predicts that both will walk to the most prominent site demarcated on the map-on Schelling's map, a bridge-even if that location stands significantly farther from one than the other. The parachutists have distinct preferences for their meeting place based on how far they must travel. Yet both will travel to the bridge due to its focal power and consequent (perhaps exclusive) ability to facilitate coordination. 109
Yet Schelling ultimately goes further, to suggest that focal points may be important in facilitating coordination even where communication is open. 110
In this conception, again going beyond most treatments of focal points among legal scholars, the key to the role of focal points is not the absence of communication; focal points are more than a substitute for communication in facilitating coordination. In "explicit bargaining," focal points may serve to redress the shortcomings of communication in the presence of conflict.
Recall that when player interests favor coordination at some equilibrium but diverge as to the equilibrium preferred, communication may be an inade quate mechanism of coordination. Into this breach, various types of focal points-including boilerplate-may step in to play an essential role. 111
C. Boilerplate in Ex plicit Bargaining
Before turning to the true focal point function I would propose for boi lerplate in explicit bargaining, we might consider a related strategic pattern in contract bargaining. As with the strategic decision to throw one's steering wheel out the window in a game of "Chicken,"
112 boilerplate may play a 111. See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 112 ("There is evidence that the influence of focal points is powerfully present even in explicit bargaining scenarios. In bargains that involve numerical magnitudes, for example, there seems to be a strong magnetism in mathematical simplicity. More impressive, perhaps, is the frequency with which long negotiations over complicated quantitative formulas converge ultimately on something as crudely simple as equal shares or shares proportion ate to some common magnitude."). To similar effect is the enumeration of triggers for anti-dilution remedies.
Longstanding provision for adjustments in the standard categories of events-stock splits, stock dividends, non-cash dividends, and warrants might allow a corporate issuer to resist pressure to provide adjustments for other corporate acts such as cash dividends or tender offers. 1 18
Ye t this calls attention to a critical caveat to this credible commitment conception of boilerplate in shaping expectations in bargaining. Specifi cally, the "boilerplate" at work is only so in a particular sense. The analysis herein is about contracting norms or standards within a particular industry or other context; I am interested in the value of adherence to such shared norms. The credible commitment function described above, how ever, arises with any contract term or form used consistently by the drafting party, without regard to its broader usage.
119 A debtor whose loan agreements consistently offer adjustment only for stock splits, stock divi dends, and non-cash dividends-but not an equally standard adjustment 114. See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at ch. 2; see also Gilo & Porat, supra note 12 at 1016-18. Separately, Schelling has identified the potential for the credibility of a commitment to be enhanced by the linkage of consistent usage to some relevant principle. See Schelling, supra note 30, at 291. A commitment to equality of treatment might be understood in this light. See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 2, at 968--09.
115. One might imagine a construct in which underwriters represent a bargaining counterpart to corporate debt issuers. Even more attenuated would be a theory of rating agencies as engaged even if only very distantly-in bargaining with issuers. In neither case, however, do we have the kind of explicit bargaining characteristic of competing parties. As to rating agencies, the relevant pattern is actually closer to a pattern of tacit bargaining.
116. The use of standardized terms in loan agreements is of particular relevance to the present analysis, moreover, given the lack of public trading of such debt and the resulting limits on network effect explanations of standardization. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. 118. See Kahan, supra note 5, at 153.
119.
Cf Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1586. This suggests the interesting question of the focal impact of a shift from one's own standard term to some more universally invoked boilerplate term. In such a circumstance, one might imagine loss of the focal power of both points.
for warrants-possesses similar credibility in its ability to hold that ground as the debtor whose consistent usage tracks the wider norm. This initial, credible commitment function of boilerplate in shaping bargaining expectations, then, turns not on the use of a standard form, but on the con sistent use of any form.
As the foregoing analysis of credible commitments in contract negotia tions suggests, aspects of the role of boilerplate in shaping expectations echo the signaling fu nctions described above.
120 Like signaling of the exis tence (or absence) of private information or of information regarding group identity, the consistent use of particular terms conveys information regarding a relevant characteristic of a bargaining party. Thus, consistent use of stan dard, dual trigger covenants might be said to signal both a median level of risk and a relative inflexibility in bargaining. The implications of the infor mation offered by boilerplate in its signaling and coordination functions, however, are distinct. The former speak to the merits of the parties' transac tion, while the latter concern the nature of their bargaining.
It is important not to overdo this distinction. Often the same information will be in play in both signaling and coordination. Further, that information may be conveyed by the very same speech or conduct. In this sense, one could well bring both signaling and coordination under one common head ing. I separate them, however, given the distinct ends to which the same information, convey ed in the same way, is being put. The information atten dant to the coordination functions of boilerplate speaks to a party's expectations regarding the bargaining outcomes acceptable to its counter part. In a sense, boilerplate's coordination functions go to process; they are about the bargaining itself. By contrast, boilerplate's signals do not speak to the expectations of a party in bargaining but to a party's character or private information or to the nature of the proposed transaction. These are relevant to the parties' bargaining, of course, but are more especially about the sub stance of that bargain. They do not directly speak to what the other side can expect in the negotiation process.
As noted above, a corporate debtor's proposed inclusion of a standard, dual trigger event risk covenant might offer certain affirm ative signals. Among others, these would include evidence of the relatively conventional risk profile of the debtor, the absence of private information regarding the enterprise's vulnerability to takeover, and the plain vanilla character of the transaction. The same debtor's consistent---e ven invariable-use of dual trigger event risk covenants, however, might also influence a potential lender's expectations of the likelihood of securing a concession to use a pure rating decline covenant instead.
121 While there is some link between the sig naling and coordination functions of boilerplate, then, the crucial feature of 120. See supra Part II.A.
121.
The use of a standardized anti-dilution formula to reduce conversion price-the standard remedy-rather than a simple notice requirement or an outright prohibition might also be seen to capture this distinction. While such standard usage offers signals regarding the issuer's fiscal stabil ity, and likely fi nancial needs, it also-if consistent-is likely to shape an investor's expectations in attempting to negotiate the terms of a new loan agreement.
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Putting aside the credible commitment function of consistent use of a given contract term, and acknowledging the distinction between the signal ing and coordination functions of boilerplate, what of the true, focal point function of boilerplate in explicit bargaining? To appreciate this dynamic, we might begin by considering cases in which it might arise. Recall once again the choice of form in the design of event risk covenants.
123 At one bound, a potential debtor might prefer to exclude any such provision. At the other, the debtor might be amenable to go so far as to include a dual trigger covenant with a limited set of triggering events and a put-at-par remedy at 95 %. The potential lender, meanwhile, might prefer a pure rating decline covenant, but be prepared to fall back as far as a dual trigger covenant with the standard list of triggering events. 124 Within the resulting bargaining zone between the parties' reservation points (that is, various forms of a dual trig ger covenant), no particular solution stands out. The same might be true in the design of anti-dilution protections for a sale of assets when both debtor and lender agree on the inclusion of some protection but diverge in their views of the appropriate mechanism and form.
125 In the face of a sale of all or substantially all assets of the debtor, standard anti-dilution terms provide for convertibility to the new form of equity offered to existing shareholders. 126 Further, they provide for release of the seller from its obligations and include a put provision for fundamental changes in control.
127 But the American Bar Foundation's Commentaries also identify potential alternatives, including merely requiring notice to holders of convertible securities, imposing an outright prohibition on certain corporate acts, or defining the potential triggering events, as well as reme dies, in a range of ways. 128 One might imagine a debtor who prefers mere notice but is determined to go no further in offering anti-dilution protection than to offer the lower of a downward conversion or market price adjust men e 29 or, in the alternative, the standard terms above . The potential lender, meanwhile, might be expected to favor prohibition but be amenable to the standard terms or to a market price adjustment triggered by a relatively comprehensive litany of triggers. Again, we find a gradation of potential deals that .the parties might strike. 129. See Kaplan, supra note 49, at 29 (noting distinct theories behind market price and con version price formulas for anti-dilution clauses).
Most tangibly, we might recall the manifestation of this pattern with price, as outlined above.
130 Our buyer is prepared to pay up to $6.00, while the seller wants at least $4.00. In such a situation, both parties would settle for a price between $4.00 and $6.00. Outside that range, either buy er or seller will demur. At all points except the bounds of the range, however, each party is also prepared to accept a higher or lower price. Hence, our difficulty.
In each of these cases, we have a multiple equilibrium game with no fa cially apparent solution.
131 Both parties stand ready to contract at some range of points within a spectrum. At all points beside the very bounds of that bar gaining zone, however, both parties are also prepared to agree to less favorable terms. 135. In enumerating the relevant unknowns, one might most broadly think of a counterparty 's value system. More specifically, a bargaining party is unsure of the other party 's commitment to certain outcomes, its willingness to take certain risks to secure preferred outcomes, and its desire (and ability) to absorb certain costs to do so. Even absent conflicting interests, it should be relatively apparent, such information is likely to be difficult to communicate. Once we introduce the conflict of bargaining, this is even more obvious.
136. See supra Part I.
137. See id.
138. See Ahdieh, supra note 14, at 239.
[Vol. 104: 1033 covenant, while the lender will insist that only a pure rating decline cove nant will do. Further, our debtor will offer mere notice of a potential dilution, at very best, while the lender will draw the line at an absolute bar. Our buyer, finally, will insist that it can afford no more than a dollar or two, while her counterpart seller will not part with her "mug" for less than $9.00.139 In each case, a party 's insistence on a particular deal point is read ily countered by insistence on an alternative deal point and strongly worded-almost boilerplate-assurances that no further concessions will be made.
Within this dynamic, what is the strategic project of each party ? Along a spectrum of potential points of agreement, how does one party maximize its share of the contractual surplus? As noted, each hopes to establish a com mitment point as distant as possible from its true reservation point as the coordination point from which it will not concede further. Yet this is a task worthy of Sisyphus if any given point of agreement looks no different than any other potential point, including those immediately to either side of it on the parties' spectrum of equilibrium solutions.
4 0
If some location-some fo cal point-along the spectrum of shared solu tions stood out or could be made to stand out, however, that point would likely be important in defining the parties' expectations of what fu rther con cessions might be made. Cf Korobkin, supra note 39, at 627-28 (describing experimental analysis of the endow ment effect).
140.
See Schelling, supra note 21, at 21-22; see also Schelling, supra note 30, at 28 1-82 ("There is some range of alternative outcomes in which any point is better for both sides than no agreement at all. To insist on any such point is pure bargaining, since one always would take less rather than reach no agreement at all, and since one always can recede if retreat proves necessary to agreement. Yet if both parties are aware of the limits to this range, any outcome is a point from which at least one party would have been willing to retreat and the other knows it! There is no rest ing place.").
As suggested above, boilerplate's signaling functions are likely to be at their acme when rele vant contracting choices have a relatively binary quality to them. By contrast, the coordination functions of boilerplate-particularly in explicit bargaining-are likely to be most significant when the parties face a range of potential equilibrium solutions. Most obviously, this is true because in a binary contracting universe, both points are focal. One solution is focal because it is boilerplate; the other is focal because it is not.
141.
See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 100, at 1266 ("Experiments confirm that, in games of multiple equilibria, salient non-payoff features (focal points) significantly facilitate coor dination."); cf sarily enjoys greater credibility as a non-negotiable position. One can appre ciate this with reference to boilerplate.
1 42
Faced with a range of potential deal points over a given contract term, within a largely undifferentiated bargaining zone, one party might be able to define a credibly firm commitment point by proposing the use of a standard boilerplate term. 1 43 In essence, a party may be able to instill greater expecta tion of its unwillingness to deviate from a given term-to concede further when it proposes a boilerplate term. The proposed use of boilerplate may thus have the effect of differentiating the relevant proposal from the pro posed adoption of any other potential deal point within the parties' bargaining zone. Extending Schelling's focal point analysis to the use of boilerplate, the latter may represent a "kind of default" in negotiation. 144 142. Distinct from its coordination functions, the proposed use of boilerplate language may help to define the parameters for bargaining over a given term given the cognitive limitations of bargaining parties. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 30, at 362-63; Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1608. A drafting party 's proposed terms may thus define a point around which subsequent negotia tions will be conducted, for the simple reason that everything in a contract cannot be negotiated from scratch. Cf Hill & King, supra note 43 (suggesting potential for form language to be used as mechanism to insert favorable language into contract). This may be especially true in the complex negotiations of interest herein. In such negotiations, some narrowing in the scope of bargaining over any particular term may be essential, given the total number of terms under negotiation. Cf Nellie Eunsoo Choi, Contracts with Open or Missing Te rms Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Common Law: A Proposal fo r Un ification, 103 CoLUM. L. REv. 50, 65 (2003) ("Wasting time by bickering over detailed language in a forty-page agreement that primarily addresses scenarios that may never occur ... is especially annoying to an action-oriented businessman."). Yet there is noth ing specific to boilerplate that causes it to serve this narrowing fu nction. Any proposed term may have the effect of constraining the universe of potentially negotiated outcomes. But see infra notes 160-167 and accompanying text.
143.
Goodpaster analogously refers to the offering of reasons, rationales, or justifications for a particular proposal. These, he suggests, make a position "more credible and, therefore, harder for the other party to assail or counter without providing equal or more persuasive reasons for his or her position." Goodpaster, supra note 17, at 345-46; see also note 114. It also bears noting, however, that credible insistence on the nature of some point as boilerplate may be effective in shaping expec tations, even if it is not actually boilerplate.
144. See SCHELLING, supra note I. Besides helping to influence the particular equilibrium ultimately emerging from bargaining parties' negotiations over any particular term, boilerplate may also be used to defi ne which issues are subject to, and which issues are excluded from, negotiation. See Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 113. By using standardized terms in certain parts of a contract but not others, a drafting party may be able to effectively de-emphasize the former. Selective use of boilerplate in a draft contract alongside tailored or even completely open-ended terms may thus define the bounds of the overall negotiation between the parties. In colloquial terms, it may help to define what is on the table. Cf Kahan & Klausner, supra note 30, at 362-63 (suggesting utility of initial control of terms given anchoring biases); Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1608; Simpson, supra note 133, at 1162.
One can visualize this possibility with an eye to standard-form consumer contracts. A form leaving price, quantity, and the warranty term open can be expected to invite negotiation as to each of these terms. By contrast, a form with blanks only for price and quantity is at least relatively less likely to prompt negotiation over the warranty. Instead, the boilerplate standard will be left to define that term. Compare Austerlitz German Shepherd Dogs Puppy Guarantee and Contract, http://www.austerlitzshepherds.com/austerlitzlcontract.html (form agreement for purchase of dogs, with only two blank terms) (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) with Janet Joers, Sample Puppy Contract, http://www.chowchowcentral.com/cccpupcontract.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (contract with additional blanks). Even if this were not always true-and one would not expect it to be so--it suggests some strategic benefit to the selective use of boilerplate in seeking to influence the scope of any given contract negotiation.
The use of boilerplate for strategic advantage is readily apparent within this conception. In essence, the proposed use of boilerplate creates a basis for a party to insist on its position; it allows that party to hold its ground. 145
Unlike other bargaining positions, as to which the marginal demand for con cessions might be expected to bear fruit, boilerplate may serve as a focal point from which a counterparty ultimately seeking agreement may be less likely to expect further movement. 146
Naturally, such an approach assumes the boilerplate term to be relatively favorable to the relevant party. Given such circumstances, however, the boi lerplate may-as a strategic matter-represent the best offer and best outcome likely to be secured. If, by contrast, the boilerplate is unfavorable to a party--or, more specifically, is worse than the deal they can expect to otherwise secure-boilerplate ceases to be of coordinative utility. The boi lerplate need not constitute a party's optimal preference; it simply needs to be sufficiently attractive (among the universe of possibilities) that its effi cacy as a bargaining position renders it optimal. Considering our event risk covenant example, a debtor's proposed adoption of a standard-form dual trigger covenant constitutes a more difficult bargaining position to displace, even if less fa vorable to the debtor than a hostile control change covenant. In essence, boilerplate allows the debtor to avoid even worse outcomes.
Boilerplate may thus offer an "indirect means" for advancing one's ne gotiating position. More concretely, the proposed use of boilerplate may allow a party "to convince the other side that [its] maximum expectation is really [its] minimum breaking-off point." 147
This coordination function of boilerplate may be especially important when tied to a party's concession on a given term.
148 Behind every negoti ated concession is the (rational) fear that it opens the door to a cascade of further demands for concessions: "If you're willing to give that much, why not this much more?" In this situation, the proposed use of boilerplate may be especially useful. It may help to shape expectations that the given con-
145.
See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 70; cf Goodpaster, supra note 17, at 342-43 ("[T]he competitive negotiator wants to persuade the other side about the firmness of [its] own assened bottom line."). Of course, the assertion of the boilerplate or otherwise standard term as one's reser vation point is itself cheap talk, at some level. It simply appears less cheap than any other potential negotiating position.
146.
See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 70-7 1 ("Most bargaining situations ultimately involve some range of possible outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail to reach agreement at all. In such a situation, any potential outcome is one from which at least one of the parties, and probably both, would have been willing to retreat for the sake of agreement, and very often the other party knows it. Any potential outcome is therefore one that either party could have improved by insisting; yet he may have no basis for insisting, since the other knows or suspects that he would rather concede than do without agreement. Each party 's strategy is guided mainly by what he expects the other to accept or insist on; yet each knows that the other is guided by reciprocal thoughts. The final outcome must be a point from which neither expects the other to retreat.").
147.
See EDWARD By way of example, when debtor and lender are negotiating the enumer ated triggers in a dual trigger covenant, the debtor can be expected to favor a short list and the lender a long one. In ultimately giving way -perhaps in exchange for some other concession-a debtor does well to fall back on the standard list of triggering events. 151 A ready answer is then available to the proposed addition of a major asset acquisition trigger, which is not ordinar ily included. If the proposed concession includes a non-standard provision for relief from an asset acquisition by the debtor, by contrast, the lender's subsequent proposal of yet further non-standard triggers becomes signifi-1 d . ffi l . 1 52 cant y more i icu t to resist.
Yet boilerplate may also be important offensively. 153 When the seemingly ascendant party to a negotiation proposes the use of boilerplate, it acts to create an expectation that further concessions will not be demanded if its proposed terms are accepted.
149.
In this vein, Ben-Shahar and White observe a dramatic deviation between auto manufac turers' contracts with information technology suppliers and the standard contract the manufacturers use with all other suppliers. Notably, the former are more generous not only on intellectual property issues but also more generally. See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 2, at 97S-79. This can readily be understood within the coordination dynamic I describe. Once the manufacturers deviate from the "hard and fast" form on intellectual property questions, holding their ground becomes more difficult as a general matter.
ISO. "The same point is illustrated when one tries to give up cigarettes or liquor. 'Just one little drink,' is a notoriously unstable compromise offer; and more people give up cigarettes alto gether than manage to reach a stable compromise at a small daily quota. Once the virgin principle is gone, there is no confidence in any resting point, and the expectation is relapse. The very recogni tion of this keeps attention focused on the point of complete abstinence." SCHELLING, supra note I, at 112.
151.
If a debtor is agreeing to triggers, thus, it ought to agree to the boilerplate enumeration of (1) the acquisition of a specified percentage of the debtor's stock, (2) replacement of a majority of the board of directors by a proxy challenge, (3) sale of substantially all the debtor's assets, (4) a merger or consolidation, or (5) the payment of dividends or repurchase of shares over a specified percentage within a defined period. See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2, at 955.
152. See id. at 96 1. The same might be said of the enumeration of events triggering anti dilution measures. By falling back on a list providing rel ief in the face of stock splits, stock divi dends, and non-cash dividends, but not the equally standard case of warrants, a lender faces the heightened prospect of arriving at an even shorter list. See Kahan, supra note S, at 153.
I 53. Sc helling captures this potential in his identification of rivers as focal points in military conflict. See Sc helling, supra note 21, at 26; see also SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 71 ("If some troops have retreated to the river in our map, they will expect to be expected to make a stand. This is the one spot to which they can retreat without necessarily being expected to retreat further, while, if they yield any further, there is no place left where they can be expected to make a determined stand. Similarly, the advancing party can expect to force the other to retreat to the river without having his advance interpreted as an insatiable demand for unlimited retreat. There is stability at the river-and perhaps nowhere else.").
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D. Boilerplate in Ta cit Bargaining
A more stylized version of the foregoing pattern may also play out in contracting circumstances akin to Schelling's "tacit bargaining."
154 In these circumstances, communication is absent, and there is consequently no nego tiation in the ordinary sense. On the other hand, divergent interests mean that bargaining persists. Recall Schelling's example, in which separated parachutists need to locate one another but stand at different distances from various points on their common map. Because the distance between each point and each parachutist is likely to be shorter for one parachutist and longer for the other, their preferred meeting places will necessarily diverge. Ye t because they must meet, each will travel the greater or lesser distance 155 necessary for them to do so.
A tacit bargaining of sorts might be said to arise in take-it-or-leave-it contracting dy namics. Most obviously, this would include standard-form consumer contracts in which no mechanism of communication is available. Even if communication could occur, moreover, the non-negotiable terms of the proposed contract put the offeree in essentially the same position. But similar patterns of tacit bargaining can also be found beyond adhesion con tracts. Among sophisticated parties, for example, the case of publicly issued debt is suggestive. With such debt, the relevant bond indenture is drafted by the issuer, who then presents its terms-as part and parcel of the issuance to potential creditors. The latter then choose to accept the terms (that is, pur chase the bond) or reject to them. Communication is unavailable and 1 1� counterproposa s cannot be offered.
In analyzing coordination dynamics, Schelling posited that a party whose interests lay closer to the likely focal point for decision might favor non-communication.
157 In the absence of communication, such a party can predictably assume the available focal point will emerge as the equilibrium solution. Given as much, the closer party might even attempt to interrupt communication.
158 By doing so, the party secures a relatively preferred solu tion. As only a focal solution can effectively coordinate the players' expectations absent communication, non-communication might be better for the closer party. One might conceive of the public issuance of debt and analogous exam ples of seriatim bargaining of a sort as having a similar quality. In this dynamic, the issuer or other drafting party can exercise discretion to define
154.
See Schelling, supra note 21, at 22.
155. See id. at 22-23.
156.
Auto manufacturers' standard-form contracts with their suppliers, which are not subject to bargaining, are another example. See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 2.
157.
See Schelling, supra note 21, at 23.
158.
See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 146 ("When the outcome depends on coordination, the timely destruction of communication may be a winning tactic. When a man and his wife are arguing by telephone over where to meet for dinner, the argument is won by the wife if she simply an nounces where she is going and hangs up. And the status quo is often preserved by a person who evades discussion of alternatives, even to the extent of simply turning off his hearing aid.").
its terms, naturally favoring those it prefers. As no rejoinder can be offered, the resulting terms are necessarily focal. If any solution is to be reached, it must be on the drafter 's terms. Of course, creditors may elect to "leave it,"
rather than "take it." If they decide to take it, however, they take it as is.
Ye t this proves too much. Any term elected by the drafter-and not boi lerplate alone-would have such a focal effect. 15 9 With non-boilerplate terms, however, the propensity to "leave it" may be significantly greater.
Boilerplate terms might therefore have significantly greater focal power. 1 6 0 Other potential occasions for this pattern of boilerplate usage might also be identified, including use of the older conversion price standard rather than the newer market price standard in anti-dilution provisions. See Bratton, supra note 2, at 687 n.76. More closely approximating the Ultimatum Game pattern, a sovereign debt issuer might utilize the standard 66.7% requirement for alterations to the pari passu clause, rather than a more favorable 50% standard, on the premise that the standard figure might be seen as fairer, notwithstanding the lack of negotiation. potential event risk covenants is the issuer's alone. Yet a bargaining dynamic remains because of the demands of the marketplace. In the face of this dy namic, use of the standard provision may be important. Potential creditors, deprived of the opportunity to negotiate, might plausibly be expected-in line with the observed expectation of fairness among contracting parties-to find a standard dual trigger covenant . significantly more palatable a focal point for agreement.
When a proposed contract term is standard, then, a non-drafting party may consider the absence of negotiation less problematic. This may even be true in the presence of significant bargaining power. Potential creditors of a relatively high-risk corporate debtor may be amenable to boilerplate terms in a public issuance even when they could have readily secured more favor able terms-a pure rating decline covenant, for example-in a private loan agreement. Such boilerplate terms might be considered fair even if less ad vantageous than potential alternatives.
166 Parties with more limited bargaining power, then, might well be expected to prefer a pattern of tacit bargaining, in the face of relatively favorable boilerplate. This approach may allow them to achieve otherwise unattainable bargaining outcomes. Through the strategic use of boilerplate, they may literally achieve more than they could have bargained for. 167
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC BOILERPLATE
In both its signaling and coordination functions, boilerplate may serve an important strategic role in bargaining. In the right hands and the right circumstances, boilerplate constitutes a weapon of choice in contract nego tiation. At least in part, this may help to explain-and to encourage-the use of boilerplate by sophisticated parties. Further, it has potential implications for the evolution of boilerplate and the nature of contract bargaining, among other things. To conclude, some of the more notable implications of strate gic boilerplate are suggested below.
A. Boilerplate and Change
As discussed in the legal literature, boilerplate would seem to possess a somewhat static and passive quality.
168 It simply is. Within a strategic con ception, by contrast, boilerplate is created, shaped, and used. If boilerplate has signaling and coordination effects, significant bargaining advantage may
166.
This dynamic is likely to be familiar to any lawyer who has sat down for a closing on a new home. While numerous terms contained in the note may appear onerous or overreaching, these are nonetheless likely to be deemed acceptable if they are standard terms. Some presumption of fairness, in essence, is ascribed to such terms. By contrast, tailored terms are likely to be subject to much sharper scrutiny. See Korobkin, supra note IO, at 1605-09 (observing resistance to alteration of terms in form agreements, even to conform with relevant default rule).
167.
Cf Korobkin, supra note 85, at 1205--06.
168.
See, e.g., John E. Murray, The Defin itive "Battle of the Forms ": Chaos Revisited, 20 J.L.
fo llow from its substantive placement. Self-interested parties would there fore do well to define or redefine contracting norms to fall at Kaldor-Hicks optimal points within potential contracting spectra. 169
While relevant to contracting parties generally, the opportunity to exer cise such influence is likely to be especially available to sophisticated parties. As repeat players, sophisticated parties have both increased oppor tunity to progressively shift the prevailing norm to a preferred point and strong incentives to do so. By allocating resources to introducing, shifting, and refining boilerplate, they may secure a heightened share of the contrac tual surplus across multiple contracts. A strategic theory of boilerplate suggests a more dynamic pattern of boi lerplate development. Boilerplate can be expected to change over time. Such change is not necessarily a product of passive evolution, moreover, but may also be driven by affirm ative investment of the time and resources necessary to effectuate it. If boilerplate serves significant signaling and coordination functions, sophisticated players likely to engage in recurrent contracting do well to seek influence in shaping prevailing contracting norms. 176
B. Rethinking Bargaining Skill
Following directly from the analysis in Section A is a potential need to rethink the nature of bargaining power. In essence, both the signaling and coordination functions of boilerplate suggest that bargaining skill (and bar gaining power) in negotiations may not be exclusively about a party's ability or capacity within the negotiation, as we conventionally think of it.
177 Rather, a significant aspect of bargaining skill and power may be the capacity to lay the groundwork for negotiation. At least some part of a party's bargaining power may tum on the pre-negotiation definition of relevant boilerplate including in the ways outlined above. In Schelling's terms, an essential skill (and fruitful task) may therefore be "to set the stage in such a way as to give 174. See Davis, supra note 172, at 1088.
175.
See Simpson, supra note 133, at 1163; see also id. at 1166 (offering example). While Simpson suggests negotiating against the lender-friendly terms contained in the Commentaries, this is rendered more difficult by the very fact of those terms ' inclusion in the Commentaries. See id. at 1167.
176.
As the implications of a strategic theory of boilerplate for boilerplate evolution suggest, such a theory speaks broadly to the important trends toward standardization in the world today. Across an array of technological, financial, and other sectors of the world economy, greater attention to the strategic dynamic of standardization is in order.
177.
See Russell Korobkin, Bargaining Po wer as Threat of Impasse, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 867, 867 (2004) ("[R]elative bargaining power stems entirely from the negotiator's ability to, explicitly or implicitly, make a single threat credibly: 'I will walk away from the negotiating table without agreeing to a deal if you do not give me what I demand. ' The source of the ability to make such a threat, and therefore the source of bargaining power, is the ability to project that he has a desirable alternative to reaching an agreement, often referred to as a 'BATNA.' "); cf Bratton, supra note 2, at 688 (referring to traditional bargaining power rationale for adoption of particular term); Roger prominence to some particular outcome that would be favorable."
178 With the use of boilerplate and similar focal points, thus, the "focus for agreement [may] not just reflect the balance of bargaining powers" but also may af firmatively "provide[] bargaining power to one side or the other." 179
In the case of signaling, to begin, the ability of a party to shape contract ing choices in binary terms may help to enhance the signaling effect of particular contracting proposals.
180 More interestingly, a repeat player might find utility in defining the prevailing contracting norm downwards, even independent of the party's substantive contracting preferences. 181 Beyond the substantive benefits, a lower bar may enhance the signal arising from any favorable deviation that the relevant party can consistently make.
As to the coordination functions of boilerplate, the same principles ap ply. Here, one would expect efforts by sophisticated parties to define the prevailing norm in terms proximate to their preferred choices. By doing so, they enhance the prospect of securing such favorable terms. Most interest ingly, this is true independent of the conventional bargaining power of the party. Thus, in David's bargaining with Goliath, David might be expected to secure potentially significant advantage by having helped to define a con tracting norm closer to his preferences. Echoing the above discussion of changes in boilerplate, moreover, it is notable that David may have greater capacity to influence the contracting norm than the outcome of his head-to head negotiations with Goliath. Thus, intermediately sized market partici pants with the foresight to plan ahead and the resources necessary to participate in organized drafting projects may be particularly advantaged by participation in such efforts.
Even relatively "weak" bargaining parties can gain advantage along the aforementioned lines, even if they cannot establish preferred terms as the prevailing standard. Assuming boilerplate favorable to its potential counter parties, a relatively weak party 's task need not be to establish new boilerplate but simply to undermine the focal power of existing boiler plate.
182 A party does so, in essence, through the creation of competing boilerplate and consequent destruction of the salience of the prevailing norm. There is no need to replace existing boilerplate; rather, a bargaining party need simply displace it as the dominant norm. This should not be overstated. I do not mean to suggest that the use of boilerplate generally-even among differently situated parties-is involun tary. To the contrary, both among sophisticated parties and even between producers and consumers, most boilerplate is likely voluntary in some rea sonable sense. My more limited point is that our sensitivity to involuntariness in consumer contracts may have some relevance in peer-to peer contracting as well. In essence, we do well to be cognizant of such is sues in cases in which the focal power of a prevailing term is sufficient to constitute the type of market power we conventionally expect to find in standard-form consumer contracts.
E. Th e Missing Focal Po ints in Law
Given the nature of bargaining as a coordination game, it is hardly sur prising to find extensive references to focal points in legal scholarship. With limited exceptions, however, these references overlook the most important implications of Schelling's focal point analysis. Echoing legal scholars' inat tention to the divergence between Ronald Coase's actual arguments and the 191. Kyle Logue suggests as a potential example of this pattern the tendency of commercial insurers to have alternative standard fo rms, the first of which represents its opening position and the second its fallback.
192.
See, e.g., 
194.
See Gilo & Porat, supra note 12.
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